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Abstract
The ﬁnancial crisis has been attributed partly to perverse incentives for traders at banks and
has led policy makers to propose regulation of banks’ remuneration packages. We explain why
poor incentives for traders cannot be fully resolved by only regulating the bank’s top executives,
and why direct intervention in trader compensation is called for. We present a model with both
trader moral hazard and adverse selection on trader abilities. We demonstrate that as competition
on the labour market for traders intensiﬁes, banks optimally oﬀer top traders contracts inducing
them to take more risk, even if banks fully internalize the costs of negative outcomes. In this way,
banks can reduce the surplus they have to oﬀer to lower ability traders. In addition, we ﬁnd that
increasing banks’ capital requirements does not unambiguously lead to reduced risk-taking by their
top traders.
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11. Introduction
The ﬁnancial crisis has been attributed partly to perverse incentives for traders at banks. High bonuses
for above average performance drove traders to engage in riskier trading strategies. Short-term trading
gains which in reality were compensation for high downside risk were disguised as proﬁts resulting from
above average trader abilities, so it has been argued1.
Policy makers across the world have responded to this observation by calling for restrictions on
bankers’ bonus payments. Indeed, bonus payments have come under severe public and political scrutiny,
and were at the focus of the September 2009 Pittsburgh G20 meeting. In 2010, the UK government
decided to introduce a temporary 50% tax on bankers’ bonuses exceeding 25,000 pounds. French
president Sarkozy promptly followed suit. In summer 2010, the EU adopted legislation reining in
bankers’ pay. Meanwhile, in the US joint supervisory agencies issued their Guidance on Incentive
Compensation, giving them the tools to ﬁght perverse incentives resulting from bankers’ remuneration
packages.
The case for reviewing the compensation of bank management is relatively clear: it complements
more standard forms of regulation by changing the bank management’s risk-taking incentives. But
should legislators also intervene at lower levels in the banks, most notably at the trader level? The
answer would be negative if too high-powered incentives for traders could be explained by similarly
high-powered incentives for bank managers, resulting for instance from excessive leverage. If this were
the sole reason for excessive trader performance pay, regulation of the bank’s top executives’ incentives
would suﬃce to rebalance traders’ incentives. Direct intervention in trader compensation, for example
through a ban on high bonus payments, would then not be called for.
This paper explores a diﬀerent rationale to intervene in traders’ remuneration. It is inspired by
claims that, even with value-maximizing bank managers, trader compensation could be excessively
high-powered as a result of strong competition on the labour market for traders2. Anecdotal evidence
of such competition abounds. In April 2010, Kaspar Villiger, chairman of the Swiss bank UBS, defended
the ﬁrm’s generous pay plans to angry shareholders by saying that an earlier move to cut compensation
had back-ﬁred. “ ‘We cut back too much last year, causing us to lose entire teams, their clients and
1See for instance Kashyap et al. (2008) and Clementi et al. (2009), to mention just some contributions from academics.
2Kashyap et al. (2008) claim that “Retaining top traders, given the competition for talent, requires that they be paid
generously based on performance”. Financial Times commentator Martin Wolf, when discussing the need for banks to
reduce perverse incentives to take on risks, writes “Yet individual institutions cannot change their systems of remuneration
on their own, without losing talented staﬀ to the competition. So regulators may have to step in.” In a similar vein,
Clementi et al. (2009) argue for closer cooperation among banks in revising employee remuneration structure: “Given
the ﬂuid market for ﬁnancial talent, no single ﬁrm can get very far on its own”.
2the corresponding revenue,’ he said. In the biggest of a series of departures, Mr Villiger revealed an
entire team of 60 employees had left UBS investment bank’s equities unit, resulting in the loss of some
SFr800m in revenues.”3 As another example, when Warren Buﬀet stepped in at Salomon Brothers in
the 1990s after the ﬁrm had gotten into trouble, he tried to realign perverse compensation practises.
This resulted in defections of top bankers, and eventually a reversal of the reforms. In his statement
for the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in 2010 Buﬀett remarked: ‘I can just tell you, being at
Salomon personally, it’s just, it’s a real problem because the fellow can go next door or he can set up
a hedge fund or whatever it may be. You don’t, you don’t have a good way of having some guy that
produces x dollars of revenues to give him 10% of x because he’ll ﬁgure out, he’ll ﬁnd some other place
that will give him 20% of x or whatever it may be.’
The idea, however, raises an immediate question. It is clear that increased competition for traders
raises their expected remuneration. But it is less clear why the need to leave a larger part of the rents
to traders should lead to a diﬀerent incentive structure. Independent of competition, the banks would
opt for the incentive structure that leads to highest overall gain, as also observed in Inderst and Pfeil
(2009).
We show that competition does increase the risk induced by traders’ incentive contracts when there
is both trader moral hazard over investment projects and adverse selection on trader abilities. Banks
use compensation schemes both to incentivize traders to choose appropriate investment projects and
to attract in particular the top traders.4 The latter goal is achieved by increasing rewards for top
results, which are more easily achieved by top traders. The downside is that this increases risk proﬁles
sought by these top traders. As competition for top traders increases, the importance of sorting the
top traders (and avoiding paying similarly high compensations to traders of average ability) grows,
and so the beneﬁt of increasing bonus pay over base wage increases, while the costs of inducing the
traders to take excessive risks remains unchanged.
We explore this in a model, assuming that traders protected by limited liability can choose between
projects that diﬀer both in expected return and in risk. We consider two types of traders, top traders
3Financial Times, Chastened UBS board promises ‘sensitivity’, April 14, 2010.
4Evidence for the fact that traders diﬀer in their trading skills (and that their trading results are not merely a matter
of luck) was provided by, for instance, Berk and Green (2004). The diﬃculty of identifying those talented traders is
eloquently described by Michael Lewis in his book “Liar’s poker”. He describes how Salomon Brothers tried to attract
new talent through a training program: ‘The class of 1984 was one of a series of human waves to wash over what was
then the worlds most proﬁtable trading ﬂoor. (...) We were a paradox. We were hired to deal in a market, to be more
shrewd than the next guy, to be, in short, traders. (...) Good traders tend to do the unexpected. We, as a group, were
painfully predictable. By coming to Salomon Brother we were simply doing what every sane money-hungry person would
do.’
3and average traders. Top traders are better at making high-risk investments than average traders
in the sense that their expected pay-out for such projects is higher. Using this idea, we make the
following points. First, when banks are monopolists and fully internalize risk, both top traders and
average traders take optimal investment decisions. Second, when banks compete for scarce talent, top
traders take excessive risk from society’s point of view, even if banks fully internalize downside risks.
Third, this excessive risk-taking by top traders gets worse as competition for such traders intensiﬁes.
Fourth, increasing the banks’ capital requirements does not fully resolve this issue (in fact, under some
conditions stricter capital requirements can increase the riskiness of top traders’ deals). Finally, our
policy implication is that caps on bonuses in addition to stricter capital requirements help to reduce
risk-taking by traders.
The mechanism that we propose has two ingredients. First, top traders are better at taking risk
than average traders. This allows banks to screen on trader type by oﬀering top traders contracts that
reward them more strongly for high outcomes. This gives top traders incentives to invest in riskier
projects than would be optimal from the bank’s perspective. Thus, banks reduce the information rents
that need to be paid to average traders by distorting the risk incentives for top traders.
Second, intensiﬁed competition for top traders means that a unilateral raise in wages allows a bank
to win over more traders from its rival. But simply increasing top traders’ wages would result in a
leakage of rents to average traders. Because incentive compatibility links the top traders’ and average
traders’ contracts, the latter also beneﬁt from the rise in competition, at a cost to the bank. To limit
these costs, the bank oﬀers the top traders higher wages in the form of higher rewards for top results
(e.g., a bonus). In this way they pay out more to top traders, while limiting the spill-over of these
beneﬁts to the average traders.
The fact that high-powered incentives can lead to excessively risky behaviour has been well-
established in the corporate ﬁnance literature since the seminal contribution by Jensen and Meckling
(1976). When corporations issue debt to outsiders, the insiders (managers, entrepreneurs) have strong
incentives to exert eﬀort. But as debt holders share in downside risk but do not beneﬁt from upside
potential, such a reliance on only debt ﬁnancing may induce managers to engage in risk shifting. We
show that even if banks internalize all downside risks, internal contracting frictions within banks still
cause the optimal contracts to top traders to feature excessive incentives to take on risk from a social
point of view.
Our paper is related to the literature on optimal contracts when both agents’ eﬀorts and risk
choices are unobservable. Hellwig (2009) and Biais and Casamatta (1999) consider optimal outside
ﬁnancing for entrepreneurs who have access to a discrete set of projects that vary in both risk and
4return. They show that combinations of ﬁnancing with outside debt and equity as well as stock options
may be called for to induce optimal project choice. Palomino and Prat (2003) address the analytically
more challenging question of optimal incentive contracts when there is a continuum of projects, each
generating a continuum of outcomes (but with diﬀerent distributions of outcomes). They observe that
in delegated portfolio management, simple bonus contracts (paying a ﬁxed fee when outcomes exceed
a certain threshold) are common, and analyse when such contracts are in fact optimal.
Our work adds to these analyses the existence of adverse selection over agent abilities, which
causes an additional loss to the principal for low-powered contracts that are required for safer deals.
Secondly, we introduce competition between principals in the model, which leads to an endogenous
reservation wage impacting on the information rents to be left to the low types. The observation
that competition on the labour market generates endogenous reservation wages that in turn inﬂuences
principals’ decisions was also made in Acharya and Volpin (2009) and Dicks (2009), in their analyses
of externalities in the adoption of tighter corporate governance regimes.
Related recent papers studying diﬀerent market failures in compensation setting within banks, and
arguing for regulation in this area, are Inderst and Pfeil (2009), Thanassoulis (2011a), Thanassoulis
(2011b), Besley and Ghatak (2011) and Acharya et al. (2011). Inderst and Pfeil (2009) study when it is
optimal to defer traders’ bonus payments until more informative signals on the eﬀect of a trader’s deals
have become available. The authors show that while postponing deals may improve traders’ incentives
to pick good deals, if the costs of such deferral become too high, the policy may backﬁre and lead
banks to focus only on average deals. Relatedly, Thanassoulis (2011b) considers how deferral of bonus
payments, necessary to avoid risk shifting, gets more and more costly as a result of rising competition
among banks to hire traders. Thanassoulis (2011a) looks at the eﬀect of employee remuneration on bank
default risk. Banks prefer large bonus components as these allow eﬃcient risk sharing between bankers
and the bank. Increasing competition for traders raises compensation, and increases bank default
risk. Besley and Ghatak (2011) analyze how bank bailouts aﬀect trader compensation structures, and
explore how regulation may be combined with taxation to restore proper incentives. Finally, Acharya
et al. (2011) explore a dynamic model of hidden trader abilities, in which increasing mobility of traders
leads to slower revelation of trader types, and skewed incentives on deal risk characteristics.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model for the banks and
traders. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium with a monopoly bank. Then we consider the case with
competing banks. Section 5 discusses how capital regulation interacts with compensation structures,
and looks at the policy implications. Finally, we oﬀer some concluding remarks.
52. The model
This section introduces the investment technologies for top and average traders. We describe the
incentive compatibility constraints and describe the banks’ payoﬀs.
2.1. Projects accessible to traders
We consider banks hiring traders to invest in projects. Traders can choose these projects p from a
continuous set of investment opportunities P. The projects diﬀer both in expected return and in risk.
We model this in a simple way by assuming that all projects yield one of three outcomes5,
x1 > x0 > 0 >  x−1.
One might interpret x0 as the average outcome of the lowest-risk projects. Higher-risk projects have
larger probability of exceptionally positive returns x1, but at the cost of a higher risk of large losses
x−1.
For any project p, the probabilities for each outcome depend on the trader type. Traders can
be either of high (H) type (‘top traders’) or of low (L) type (‘average traders’). For a project p,
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1 (p)) we can plot the space of available projects P as regions PH,L
in a diagram with average outcome (x0) probability q0 on the horizontal axis, and high outcome (x1)
probability q1 on the vertical axis, as in ﬁgure 1. Traders will choose projects in the upper boundaries
of the regions PH,L (the bold curves). Such projects maximize q1 for given q0, and hence minimize
failure probability q−1. We assume these boundaries to be smooth and concave. In other words, the
gain in proﬁts due to a higher probability of a good outcome decreases as q0 drops. By assumption,
top traders can achieve higher probabilities for high outcomes q1 for any given q0 than average traders
do. Average traders are less adept at creating value by moving away from the risk-free project where
q0 = 1. Hence, given some value of q0 < 1, their trades will be less proﬁtable compared to the trades
a top trader would do at that same level of q0.
The point q0 = 1, which has q1 = q−1 = 0, represents a risk-free project that is accessible to both
high and low type traders. Moving left on the boundary, projects have a higher probability q1 of the
high outcomes, at the cost of a higher failure probability q−1 = 1   q1   q0. This increase in failure
risk implies that
dq1
dq0 >  1 everywhere on the upper boundary of P. Note, however, that if we move









Figure 1: The set of projects for high and low types, PH and PL. The tangent points to the dashed
lines represent the bank-proﬁt maximizing projects.
from q0 = 1 to q0 = 0, risk always increases, and the expected return to society q1x1 + q0x0   q−1x−1
has a maximum.
2.2. The contracts
We assume that there is moral hazard and adverse selection in the model. The bank does not observe the
project p chosen by the trader, it only observes realized outcomes. Alternatively, it has no information
on the probability distribution of the outcomes. Nor can the bank observe the trader’s type. The
agent, i.e., the trader, knows his type and is fully informed on the outcome probabilities q
H,L
i (p)
(i 2 f 1,0,1g) associated with each project p.
Banks can use their contracts with traders to resolve the moral hazard over project choice. The
banks oﬀer both high and low type traders take-it-or-leave-it contracts, specifying remunerations con-
tingent on observed outcomes (i.e. payments w−1,w0,w1 for outcomes x−1,x0,x1), which the traders
then accept or reject. We assume that traders have limited liability, so that wages under any outcome
are non-negative. Without loss of generality we assume that the bank oﬀers wage w−1 = 0 when loss
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contracts designed for the high, low types, respectively. Given these wages, traders will choose the



























where upper (lower) case refers to high (low) type contract. For given p with q0(p) < 1, as R(r)
increases, the high (low) type trader faces a higher income risk. Further, a larger risk R (or r) will
lead the high (low) trader to place a higher weight on the probability of high outcomes x1, relative to
average outcomes x0. In that case, maximum trader utility (1) will be attained at a lower value of q0,
and a higher value of both q1 and q−1. Higher R,r will thus lead traders to choose projects with higher
risk of extreme outcomes, and lower probability of an average outcome.
In what follows, it will be convenient to characterize contracts in terms of the risk parameters,





1 ; (R,U) thus refers to the high types’ contract, and (r,u) to the contract oﬀered to the low
types. The (R,U) contract is the combination of wages (wH
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A similar expression, with qL
i (p) replacing qH
i (p) and (r,u) replacing (R,U), obtains for the low type.
Since trader type is not observable to the bank, contracts have to respect incentive compatibility.
Consider ﬁrst the low type’s incentive constraint. When confronted with the same (wH
0 ,wH
1 ) compen-
sation contract, the low type will choose the project that, given R, optimizes his own pay-oﬀ. The low
type’s utility ^ u from accepting the high type’s oﬀer is









Since the utility maximizing project for either type only depends on R, we see that the ratio of the
low type’s utility upon accepting the high type’s contract, ^ u, and the high type’s utility from the same
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 1.
Because the low type cannot get more utility from a compensation contract than the high type
can, who has superior success probabilities for any risk level R, we have that f(R)  1.
In terms of parameters (r,u) and (R,U) the incentive compatibility condition then amounts to
u  Uf(R). (2)
8We assume that a single crossing property holds for this problem. In particular, we assume that
when both types’ indiﬀerence curves intersect (in (w0,w1)-space), the curve for the high type is ﬂatter
than the curve for the low type. This translates into
Assumption 1 ∂^ u
∂R
   
U = Uf′(R) < 0.
This assumption says that an increase in R (for given U) lowers the utility derived by the low type
from accepting a high-type contract.
Consider next the high type’s incentive compatibility condition. A similar argument shows that if





Combining the two IC constraints, we obtain that an equilibrium should satisfy
Uf(r)  u  Uf(R),
and since f′ < 0, this can only hold if R  r. As we will see below, the binding constraint in our model
is that low types have no incentive to pose as high types. This is due to the (endogenously) higher
outside option of the high type. The high type’s IC constraint will then be slack when R > r.
Secondly, we assume that the second derivative of f is larger than or equal to zero. This assumption
will guarantee that we get an interior solution in the sections below.
Assumption 2 ∂2^ u
∂R2
 
   
U
= Uf′′(R)  0.
In words, there are decreasing returns for the bank of using risk R to reduce low type’s utility ^ u.
The following example illustrates both assumptions.
Example 1 Suppose that low types cannot get high pay-oﬀs at all, and will therefore execute the riskless
project with q0 = 1 for any level of risk r. Low type utility is then independent of the bonus payment
w1,
u = w0,
i.e. in the w1,w0 plane, the low-type’s indiﬀerence curves are the verticals, w0 = constant. For the
high types, there is a trade-oﬀ between w1 and w0, and the high types’ indiﬀerence curves are downward
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92.3. The banks
Banks are the principals of the agent traders. Banks oﬀer (U,R) and (u,r) contracts to optimize their
proﬁts. Bank proﬁts will be the sum of proﬁts from all projects, minus utility left to the traders.
We assume that in the bad state, the bank suﬀers a loss equal to α  x−1. That is, α measures a
bank’s liability to losses (x−1 outcomes). If α = x−1, banks fully internalize the probability of negative
outcomes. If α < x−1, banks can shift some of the risks to outsiders, such as debt holders, or the
government in case of bail-out guarantees. The parameter α may therefore be interpreted as a reduced
form of a capital requirement. We refer to an increase in α as an increase in capital requirements for
the bank.
Expected gross proﬁt from a high type trader’s project depends on the high type’s risk parameter
R as well as the bank’s liability to losses α and is denoted
(R,α) = qH
1 (p(R))x1 + qH
0 (p(R))x0   αqH
−1(p(R))
= qH
1 (p(R))(x1 + α) + qH
0 (p(R))(x0 + α)   α. (3)
To get the bank’s net proﬁts from a top trader, one has to subtract the expected utility left to the
trader, U. Similarly, we denote by π(r,α) the gross proﬁts from low type traders’ projects.
Taking trader utilities U,u as given, the optimal projects, from the point of view of the bank, have
risk parameters R,r that maximize (R,α), respectively π(r,α). The maxima are attained for projects















Though the optimal project will be a diﬀerent one for the high trader type than for the low one, for
either type the slope of the upper project boundary at the optimal project will be the same. These
points are shown in ﬁgure 1 at the tangents to the dashed lines.
Traders, when choosing projects to maximize utility in response to a contract of risk level R, r,

















This shows that in the absence of incentive compatibility constraints, the bank could fully resolve
moral hazard and induce traders to choose the privately optimal project. To see this, deﬁne




which solve R(R∗(α),α) = πr(r∗(α),α) = 0. Then banks can oﬀer traders contracts with R∗(α)(r∗(α))
and utility equal to their reservation utilities. If α = x−1, then these risks correspond to the optimal
risks from society’s point of view.
10Note that R∗
α(α) < 0, i.e., when banks bear a larger fraction of the downside risk, they will oﬀer
traders contracts inducing them to take less risk (if incentive compatibility constraints play no role).
Hence in the absence of incentive constraints, increasing capital requirements reduces risk.
The following result6 demonstrates that R∗, r∗ are the unique local maxima of  and π:
Lemma 1 The functions (R,α) and π(r,α) are quasi-concave in R,r.
In the next sections, we show that, when faced with incentive compatibility constraints, the bank
may distort the high types’ risk R to larger values, inducing them to pursue higher risk projects.
3. A monopoly bank
As a benchmark, we consider ﬁrst the case of a monopoly bank and inelastic labor supply where all
traders have the same outside option. We assume unit trader supply. A fraction ϕ of these are low-
type traders, 1   ϕ are high-type ones. Reservation wages for low and high-type traders are  u =  U,
respectively. We assume that ,π are high enough that the bank wants to hire both types. The bank
does not observe trader types. It solves
max
R,r,U,u
ϕ(π(r,α)   u) + (1   ϕ)((R,α)   U) (5)
s.t. u  Uf(R)
U   U
u   u
where the ﬁrst constraint is the average trader’s incentive compatibility condition, and the other two
constraints are participation constraints for the top trader and the average trader, respectively.
Clearly, in the optimum, the low type will be oﬀered a contract with optimal risk, r = r∗(α).
The high type will be oﬀered utility equal to his reservation utility, U =  U. Because reservation
wages of both types are equal, it follows that the incentive compatibility constraint u  Uf(R) is not
binding. Hence, the monopoly bank oﬀers the unconstrained proﬁt maximizing contracts, (r∗(α),  u)
and (R∗(α),  U). Because of equation (4) and  u =  U, this is in fact a pooling contract. Hence, both
incentive compatibility constraints are satisﬁed. We have shown the following.
Proposition 1 A monopoly bank oﬀers traders contracts inducing them to take risks that maximize
the bank’s proﬁts, R = R∗(α) = r = r∗(α), and leaves them their reservation utilities.
6Proofs of lemmas are in the appendix.
11When incentive compatibility does not bind, the only distortion of the monopoly bank is that for
α < x−1 the bank does not fully internalize losses. Both the high-type and the low type risk, R and r,
are then excessive from a social point of view, as a result of the bank’s risk-shifting to its debt holders.
If α = x−1, this distortion is eliminated, and ﬁrst-best is achieved.
Finally, it follows from equation (4) that in the monopoly case increasing capital requirements α
reduce risks R and r. If α = x−1, banks choose socially optimal contracts and there is no need for
bonus caps. Hence, in this case, capital requirements which align the incentives of the top of the bank
with social incentives leads to a ﬁrst best outcome. There is no need to intervene with traders’ salaries.
As the next section shows, this is diﬀerent with competing banks.
4. Oligopoly banks
We now turn to competition among banks in hiring traders. Consider two symmetric banks, a and
b, competing imperfectly for both high types and low types. In contrast to the monopoly case, the
traders’ reservation utilities now arise endogenously from the model, and reﬂect the option traders
have to accept a contract at the rival bank. That is, traders have two outside options now: (i) doing
nothing, which gives an outside option (as above) equal to the reservation wage ( u =  U); (ii) work at
the other bank. The latter outside option is considered now.
Bank a optimizes its proﬁts given the contract oﬀered by bank b, subject to the incentive compat-
ibility constraint for the low-type traders
max
u,r,U,R
s(u,ub)(π(r,α)   u) + S(U,Ub)((R,α)   U)
subject to u  f(R)U
(Pub,Ub)
where s(ua,ub) represents bank a’s share of low-type traders when bank a oﬀers them utility ua and
bank b oﬀers ub. We still assume inelastic supply of traders, so that s(ua,ub) + s(ub,ua) = ϕ. Similar
remarks hold for the high types’ shares S(Ua,Ub).
The ﬁrst part of the maximand in (Pub,Ub) represents bank a’s net gains from low type traders’
activities. The second component reﬂects the contribution from the high-type traders to the bank’s
proﬁt. In a symmetric equilibrium, both banks evenly share the amount of top traders as well as
average traders.


















7This is a standard way to model competition. See, for instance, Tirole (1988).
12where we allow the competition parameters tl,h to depend on the type. Hence, we consider a Hotelling
beach of length 1 where low (high) traders are distributed uniformly with density ϕ(1   ϕ). Bank a
is located on the far left of the beach and bank b on the far right. Traders face a travel cost per unit
distance equal to tl(th) for the low (high) type. Hence the average trader who is indiﬀerent between
working for either bank is a distance x away from bank a where x solves
ua   tx = ub   t(1   x).
This gives the expression for s above and similarly for S.
A reduction in th is interpreted as increasing competition on the labour market for high traders.
Throughout the analysis we assume tl,th to be suﬃciently low so that in equilibrium all traders
will accept a contract, i.e., the Hotelling beach is fully covered. To guarantee that this happens in
equilibrium, we make the assumption
Assumption 3 π(r∗(α),α)    u > 2tl, (R∗(α),α)    U > 2th
If banks could ignore the incentive compatibility constraint, they would choose r = r∗(α),R =
R∗(α). It is routine to verify that this results in the following utilities for the low-type and the
high-type traders (gross of their travel costs)8
u∗ = π(r∗,α)   tl (7)
U∗ = (R∗,α)   th (8)
The incentive compatibility constraint is binding in equilibrium if
f(R∗)((R∗,α)   th) > π(r∗,α)   tl (9)
If this inequality is not satisﬁed, the analysis here is the same as with a monopoly bank. However,
we are interested in the case where the incentive compatibility constraint is binding. In that case,
given contract oﬀers R∗(α) and r∗(α) the low type will want to accept the high-type contract. We will
henceforth assume this to be the case.
Directly taking into account that the incentive compatibility condition binds, we rewrite optimiza-
tion problem (Pub,Ub) as
max
r,U,R
s(f(R)U,ub)(π(r,α)   f(R)U) + S(U,Ub)((R,α)   U) ( ^ Pub,Ub)
The ﬁrst order condition for r implies that r = r∗, the contract for the average trader is not distorted
(’no distortion at the top’), as is to be expected. The ﬁrst order conditions for U and R can be written





















(π(r∗,α)   Uf(R)   tl) +
1   ϕ
2th




(π(r∗,α)   Uf(R)   tl) +
1   ϕ
2
R(R,α) = 0 (Urc)
The solutions to these ﬁrst-order conditions correspond to curves U(R). We refer to these curves as the
utility curve Uuc(R) and the risk curve Urc(R), resp. Note that these curves are continuous functions
of R.
It will also be convenient to use the incentive compatibility curve, which measures (as a function
of R) utility at which the low type is indiﬀerent between his contract and the high-type contract. This





At all points (U,R) with U  Uic(R), the low types’ incentive compatibility constraint will be binding.
An equilibrium is a pair U,R that simultaneously solves both ﬁrst-order equations (Uuc) and
(Urc), and therefore geometrically corresponds to an intersection of the risk and the utility curves,
Uuc(R) = Urc(R). This is illustrated in ﬁgure 2. In the following, we will study the nature of
such intersections. In particular, we will be interested in comparative statics of the equilibrium with
respect to the level of competition for high types, parametrized by th. We interpret quotes like (see
introduction) “you don’t have a good way of having some guy that produces x dollars of revenues to
give him 10% of x because he’ll ﬁgure out, he’ll ﬁnd some other place that will give him 20% of x or
14whatever it may be” as competition. If 20% becomes 30%, we interpret this as a reduction in th. We
are not aware that banks compete more vigorously for low type traders. Hence we do not consider
changes in tl.
The following lemmas are useful below.
Lemma 2 With the privately optimal R∗(α), which is deﬁned in equation (4), we have
i) Urc(R∗(α)) = Uic(R∗(α))
ii) Urc(R) > Uic(R) for all R > R∗(α)
iii) Uuc(R∗(α)) > Uic(R∗(α))
The lemma states that at the privately optimal R∗(α) the risk curve intersects the incentive com-
patibility curve, while the utility curve lies above it. In addition, the utility curve lies above the risk
curve for R = R∗(α). This shows that if there is an equilibrium at ﬁnite R – characterized by an in-
tersection of both curves – the risk curve Urc(R) will cross the utility curve from below. The following
lemma gives a suﬃcient condition for such an intersection point at ﬁnite R to exist.
Lemma 3 A suﬃcient condition for existence of an intersection of the risk and utility curves is that
for some  R > R∗ large enough,
f(  R)((  R,α)   th) = π(r∗,α)   tl.
The condition says that for high enough risks R, the low type will have no incentive to mimic the
high type.
Lastly, we cannot exclude that multiple intersections of both curves exist: although the risk curve
is everywhere upward sloping (see equation (10) in the appendix), the utility curve is not necessarily
monotonically decreasing. If there are multiple intersections, however, we focus on the one with lowest
R. The following lemma demonstrates that this lowest-R equilibrium is the one that is preferred by
both banks, as it maximizes total proﬁts.
Lemma 4 If there are multiple equilibria, and (R,α) is concave in R for R > R∗(α), total ﬁrm
proﬁts are maximized at the equilibrium with lowest R.
In the following, we assume that an equilibrium (at ﬁnite R) exists. Assuming concavity of R
(which translates into a condition on the third derivative of qH
1 (qH
0 )), Lemma 4 justiﬁes a focus on
the intersection at the lowest R, if multiple intersections exist. As banks make the oﬀers, it is not
unreasonable to assume that they manage to coordinate on the equilibrium that is best for them
15(coalition proof equilibrium). Hence, from now on the term “equilibrium” refers to the joint solution
of the ﬁrst order conditions with the lowest R.
Our ﬁrst main result follows from lemma 2.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium R > R∗(α).
Indeed, the intersection of the risk curve and the utility curve must lie above the privately optimal
value R∗(α), because at this value the risk curve intersects the incentive compatibility curve, while the
utility curve lies above it. Hence with competing banks, the incentive compatibility constraint leads
banks to induce excessive risk for the top traders. Since risk is excessive even when α = x−1, i.e.
when banks internalize all losses, raising capital requirements (increasing α) cannot fully resolve the
ineﬃciency.
The second main result of this paper is that banks incentivize top traders to take more risk as the
competition for top traders intensiﬁes, i.e., the risk problem becomes worse.
Proposition 3 If competition for the high-type traders increases (th falls), banks induce these traders
to take more risk by increasing R.
Proof. By lemma 2, the equilibrium corresponds to an intersection of the risk and utility curves
where the risk curve intersects the utility curve from below. Only the utility curve depends on com-




Hence a decrease in th causes the utility curve to shift upwards. As a result, the intersection shifts to
the right, to higher R.
The intuition behind this result is the following. As th falls, traders switch banks more easily to
increase their income. In that case, banks experience stronger gains to increasing top traders’ wages U
to win them over, at the expense of rival banks. In equilibrium, banks do not beneﬁt from this race to
higher top trader wages. To the contrary, incentive compatibility also forces banks to increase wages
for the low types. In an attempt to keep this leakage of rents to the average traders low, banks prefer
to raise R: the marginal beneﬁts to increasing R increase, while the marginal costs (in terms of less
eﬃcient top trader projects), remain the same.
5. Policy implications
In the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis, there has been much debate on curtailing bankers’ bonuses, in a
bid to reduce bank risk taking. While the beneﬁts of reducing top executives’ risk appetite are little
16disputed, the desirability of intervention in wage contracts lower in the bank hierarchy is less obvious.
If bank management internalizes the risk of negative outcomes, e.g. through higher equity stakes in
the bank, won’t their risk attitude trickle down to the lower trader echelons through the contracts
these are oﬀered?
In our analysis of a monopoly bank, we found that as the managers’ risk attitude is brought
more in line with social welfare (α increases), the risk level R(α) in top traders’ contracts decreases.
However, in the case of competition for traders, this need no longer be true. The following proposition
demonstrates that the eﬀect of increasing α on R can be counter-intuitive.
Proposition 4 When banks compete for traders, an increase of capital requirements (i.e., an increase
in α) can sometimes increase, rather than decrease, risk in the top traders’ equilibrium contract, dR
dα > 0.
Proof. We prove the proposition by constructing an example. Consider ﬁrst the extreme case
where top traders can only do one deal. In that case, proﬁt is independent of the risk these traders
take and the contract oﬀered by banks simply aims to reduce the rents obtained by low-type traders.
This implies R = 0, and the ﬁrst-order condition for R becomes
π(r∗,α)   Uf(R)   tl = 0,
so that the risk curve coincides with the incentive compatibility curve: since there is no cost to the
bank of increasing R, it will raise R to set u to its unconstrained value.
In this case, the ﬁrst-order condition for U will require U to be set to its ﬁrst-best as well,
U = (α)   th.
Combining these two ﬁrst-order equations, we ﬁnd
((α)   th)f(R) = π(r∗,α)   tl.









−1 < 0, α =  qH
−1 < 0,
so that if in the optimum, the low type’s risk of negative outcome x−1 is larger than the high type’s
risk, we ﬁnd dR
dα > 0, i.e. high type risk increases with α. While the example of ﬁxed project choice
is extreme, the analysis clearly continues to hold if the high type’s project-outcome probabilities,
qH
1,0,−1(p(R)), change suﬃciently slowly as R is increased.
17The intuition for the result is that an increase in α increases the bank’s aversion to negative
outcomes x−1. Negative outcomes result both from top traders’ projects, and from those of the
average traders. If the latter create the larger downside risks, banks tend to reduce low-types’ utilities
u in an eﬀort to lose low type traders to the rival bank as α increases. They will do so by increasing R
if this is not too costly (and it will not be costly if high type’s project choice is rather inelastic w.r.t.
R). In doing so, however, banks impose a competitive externality on each other. In equilibrium both
banks continue to share the average traders evenly, so the increase in high-type risk R does not help
them to reduce exposure to low-type downside risks.
We conclude that measures aimed at reducing bank risk only at the top of the bank hierarchy may
have unintentional eﬀects on the risk attitudes of individual bank traders. These eﬀects result from a
combination of agency problems within the banks, and spill-over eﬀects mediated through competition
on the labour market among banks. Directly regulating bonus pay also at lower bank levels can
therefore be a useful complement to measures regulating bank risk at the top levels.
It is clear that a binding cap on traders’ bonus structures, R, will lead to higher social eﬃciency,
as long as R > R∗(α = x−1). Imposing such a cap will impact not only on traders’ risk-taking, but
also on their utilities. The direction of this eﬀect on expected wages is ambiguous. When R is capped
at a level ^ R (and the cap binds), equilibrium utility is given by the utility curve, Uuc( ^ R). This curve
is increasing at the social optimum R = R∗(α), but it is not monotonic in R. A reduction in R below
unconstrained equilibrium levels may therefore either increase or decrease top traders’ expected pay.
Taxing traders’ pay is an alternative policy to address excessive risk-taking. If traders only receive a
fraction 1 T of the utility paid to them by their employers (where T denotes the tax rate), the banks’
proﬁt functions change: the fraction of traders attracted by bank a now depends on (1 T)(Ua Ub). As
can be seen from the Hotelling speciﬁcation, (6), this eﬀectively increases the competition parameter,
muting labour market competition among banks and reducing the competitive externality among the
banks. As a result, equilibrium R will be reduced.
6. Concluding remarks
We provide a model rationalizing the claim that increased competition for traders forces banks to
execute riskier deals. The mechanism for excessive risk taking we describe here is diﬀerent from the
usual one where banks fail to fully internalize their losses. In the present model, there is not necessarily
a problem of bank limited liability and risk shifting. Even if banks fully internalize the costs of negative
outcomes (which is the case if α = x−1), banks oﬀer traders excessively risky contracts to screen on
18trader type and to minimize transfers to lower-skilled employees.
We have two main results. First, banks oﬀer riskier contracts (higher R) as competition for top
traders intensiﬁes (th gets lower). When competition increases, the rents banks have to pay to attract
top traders increase. To avoid leakage of these rents to average traders, the higher payment comes in
the form of contracts paying larger bonuses and hence inducing more risk-taking by top traders.
Second, raising capital requirements does not necessarily result in banks oﬀering traders contracts
that reduce risk-taking. If average traders create more downside risk than top traders, banks that
are confronted with a higher liability for losses (higher α) may increase R in an eﬀort to lose the
lower-skilled traders to rival banks: higher R will reduce these traders’ utility. Consequently, bonus
payments to top traders will not automatically decrease when higher capital requirements force banks
to internalise a larger fraction of potential losses.
Although a regulator faces the same adverse selection over trader types as the banks do, a planner
will not resort to ineﬃcient screening by oﬀering excessive incentives. The reason is that while banks
distort production to change the distribution of proﬁts among themselves and the traders, for the
regulator these payments are pure transfers.9 Therefore, there is a role for direct intervention in
compensation structures, aimed at reducing trader incentives towards risk-taking.
This leaves the question why competition over skilled traders should have increased in the build-
up to the present ﬁnancial crisis. One explanation could be that competition in ﬁnancial institutions’
product markets intensiﬁed as well. As ﬁrms face stiﬀer competition in attracting clients, a competitive
advantage becomes more valuable, and top traders may provide such an advantage. The competition
over traders in our model would in that case be a reduced form of competition in product markets.
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20A. Appendix: Proofs
Proof of lemma 1 We focus on (R,α), as the result for π(r,α) is analogous. For any given R,
high-type traders choose the project on the project boundary qH
1 (qH







relation deﬁnes a function qH



























dR  0, we ﬁnd that  is monotonically increasing for R < R∗(α) = x1+α
x0+α, and monotonically
decreasing for R > R∗(α). Hence (R,α) is quasi-concave in R. Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 2 When inserting U = Uic(R∗) in the risk curve equation (Urc), the ﬁrst term
vanishes and we are left with R(R,α) = 0, which is indeed solved by R = R∗. This proves (i). For
R > R∗, R(R,α) < 0, so the ﬁrst term in equation (Urc) has to be positive. Since f′(R) < 0, this
implies that Urc(R)f(R) > π(r∗,α)   tl = Uic(R)f(R), proving (ii). Finally, for the utility curve,
assume (iii) does not hold, so Uuc(R∗)  Uic(R∗). Then by the deﬁnition of the utility curve, (Uuc),
we would have that (R∗,α)   Uuc(R∗)   th  0, or (R∗,α)   th  Uuc(R∗)  Uic(R∗). But this
conﬂicts with our assumption (9) that at R∗, incentive compatibility does not hold. So (iii) must hold.
Q.E.D.
Proof of lemma 3 The condition is equivalent to Uuc(  R) = Uic(  R), as can be veriﬁed by setting
Uuc(  R)f(  R) = π(r∗,α)   tl in equation (Uuc). By lemma 2 (i) and (iii), the risk curve is below the
utility curve at R = R∗, while by (ii), the risk curve is above the incentive compatibility curve Uic(R)
for all R > R∗. If the utility curve Uuc(R) crosses the incentive compatibility curve at  R, it must have
intersected the risk curve at least once at some R∗ < R <  R. This point of intersection corresponds
with a symmetric equilibrium. Q.E.D.








We will now show that these proﬁts tot(U,R) are decreasing as one moves along the risk curve Urc(R)
to higher R, i.e. dtot
dR (Urc(R),R) < 0. Since any symmetric equilibrium (U,R) should lie on the risk
curve, this will prove the lemma.





Uf′′(R)(π(r∗,α)   Uf(R)   tl)   U2f′(R)2 + RR(R,α)
f′(R)(π(r∗,α)   2Uf(R)   tl)
> 0 (10)
21because f′(R) < 0 by assumption 1, f′′(R)  0 by assumption 2 and π(r∗,α)   2Uf(R)   tl <
π(r∗,α)   Uf(R)   tl < 0 by equation (Urc) and R < 0 for R > R∗(α) (from lemma 2).
Since Urc(R) increases monotonically, the ﬁrms’ proﬁts from high type traders unambiguously
decrease with increasing R. However, this is not necessarily the case for the contribution from low




Uf′′(R)(π(r∗,α)   Uf(R)   tl) + RR(R,α)
f′(R)(π(r∗,α)   2Uf(R)   tl)
f(R) +
Uf′(R)(π(r∗,α)   Uf(R)   tl)
(π(r∗,α)   2Uf(R)   tl)
.
(11)
The ﬁrst term is positive, but the second one is negative and the net result may be negative. The term
 
ϕ
2Uf(R) in the proﬁt function may therefore create a positive contribution to the derivative of total
proﬁts, tot. We can see, nevertheless, that the oﬀending positive term in the change in total proﬁts,






π(r∗,α)   Uf(R)   tl
tl
,
which follows from the equation for the risk curve (Urc). Comparison with the second term in (11)
makes clear that their net contribution to dtot




Uf′(R)(π(r∗,α)   Uf(R)   tl)








π(r∗,α)   2Uf(R) < 0.
But since Uf(R) > π(r∗,α)   tl (as IC is binding), we have
π(r∗,α)   2Uf(R) < tl   Uf(R) < tl   u∗ < 0
with the latter inequality our assumption of full market coverage, assumption 3. Q.E.D.
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